James E. Faulconer
See, in particular, "sublime" (LM, July 9, 2003)
The following introduction and list of definitions was originally created for a faculty seminar on postmodernism held at Brigham Young University during Winter semester 1997. I have not edited them for a new audience. As a result, it may be a mystery why some terms are included (they came up in readings for the seminar) and some may find things to argue with in the definitions. Good. This is, after all, philosophy.
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Here are some of the terms we will be using, including terms from Lyotard's essays. I give brief (and, therefore, inadequate)
discussions of their meaning. Rather than leave something out, I have erred on the side of including the obvious. I will add to the list
as the seminar progresses by updating this list at our web-site. If you have suggestions of things to add, please feel free to pass them on
to me.
Age of Reason: See Enlightenment.
Anamnesis: The transliteration of a Greek word for "remembering." Plato argued that we learn by remembering what we learned before coming to this world.
Anagogy: The transliteration of a Greek word meaning "to lead up." It is the name of method of interpretation that looks for a spiritual meaning, particularly in scriptural texts. The meaning is usually not obvious.
Anamorphosis: The transliteration of a Greek word meaning "transformation." An anamorphosis is the transformation of an image so that it is unrecognizable except from a particular point of view or with the aid of a special lens. The strange figure, a distorted skull, at the bottom of Hans Holbein the Younger's painting, "The Ambassadors" (London, National Gallery), is an excellent example of anamorphosis.
Critical: As used in Kant's philosophy, this adjective refers to the philosophical/rational ability to delimit reason. Kant's first major work, The Critique of Pure Reason set out to show the limits of reason so as to open up the possibility of talking meaningfully about morality and religion, matters that do not fall exclusively within the compass of reason. For example, Kant argued that, though reason enables us to think about causation, it does not allow us to think about the cause of causation. Reason will come to contradictory but equally plausible conclusions ("antinomies") if it tries to think about things beyond its limits, such as the cause of causation.
Dialectic: The word comes from the Greek word for conversation, . It has a wide variety of uses in philosophy, but in the work we will be reading it will usually refer to Hegel's use. On Hegel's understanding of dialectic, one examines a position or state of affairs and discovers within it problems and contradictions that allow one to take a new position or set up a new state of affairs that incorporates responses to those problems or contradictions. Hegel's notion of dialectic is often described as a process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis though he did not use those terms himself and though his understanding of dialectic cannot be reduced to that triadic pattern. Hegel, like Marx who followed him in this, believed that the dialectic would come to an end in history: at some point all contradiction and inadequacy will be overcome. However, not all who think dialectically believe in such an end.
Enlightenment: (I depend heavily, though not exclusively, on the entry in The Encylopedia of Philosophy.) Part of modernism, the Enlightenment is often identified with "the Age of Reason," though the latter is also often used as a broader term, with "the Enlightenment" referring to the eighteenth century and "the Age of Reason" referring to both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Enlightenment in the narrower sense began as mostly a French movement. Enlightenment thought was based on the work of the seventeenth-century philosophers, especially John Locke, and was much impressed by Newtonian physics. As is true for any period, it is impossible to define exactly what constitutes Enlightenment thinking. Nevertheless, three terms are especially important: reason, nature, and progress.
Reason: Following Descartes (via Locke), Enlightenment thinkers took reason to be the sense common to human beings. Reason replaced tradition as the "common sense." Most went so far as to believe that the differences in rational ability between persons were, in principle, negligible. As the French Encyclopédie said, "Reason is to the philosophe what grace is to the Christian." For them, reason is a sense most evident in the proofs of geometry and a sense that can be sharpened by training in logic. Reason was assumed to be a matter of method and to be based on indubitable assumptions. (See Descartes' Discourse on Method for Rightly Conducting the Reason, especially "Part 2.") Thus, to be rational was to begin with the appropriate premises and then to proceed methodically. The seventeenth-century development of a modern scientific method heavily influenced Enlightenment thinking about reason; the Enlightenment insistence on the methodical character of reason has heavily influenced our thought about reason since.
In spite of the fact that Enlightenment thinkers took reason to be a natural ability of any human being, most of them also assumed that the average person's reason has been corrupted by the cultural environment and especially by the influence of churches. Churches were considered the most corrupting of influences because churches put revelation above reason and hold that there is something that transcends reason. (On this score, Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson are excellent examples of Enlightenment thinkers.) The enlightened were those who have escaped the thrall of this influence--those who have escaped the, at best, hasty judgments ("prejudices") of religion and everyday culture. The job of the enlightened was to bring about the changes that would allow enlightenment to spread. Therefore, most Enlightenment thinkers saw their work to be that of replacing religion with reason (or with a religion of reason).
Many Enlightenment thinkers believed in God, but most were deists: God created the universe, but he no longer bothers with it. Using an old metaphor, David Hume argued that God is at least as good a creator as a human clock-maker, and we would respect no clock maker who had to intervene in the workings of a clock once it had been made.
Nature: According to the Enlightenment, by the exercise of reason, one can undo the damage created by religion and society and uncover--discover--the nature that lies waiting to be revealed beneath but obscured by prejudices. Religious discussions of the "supernatural" (a word that acquired its negative meaning at this time) were assumed simply to be discussions of something that does not exist. That to which those discussions supposedly refer were said to be figments of priestly imagination designed to keep human beings ignorant so that priests and popes could have power. Besides denying the supernatural, Enlightenment thinkers talked about the "unnatural." Unlike the supernatural, the unnatural does exist, but it is the artificial. The artifices of custom and tradition are examples of unnatural things. (And the "natural foods" movement is a child of Enlightenment thinking.) For Enlightenment thinkers, nature is the Good, and they assumed that, by stripping away the prejudices of custom, tradition, and religion and replacing those prejudices with the results of the careful use of reason alone, humankind would discover, implicit in nature, the aesthetic and ethical goals and standards. (Though Descartes was a seventeenth-century thinker rather than an eighteenth, his Discourse is explicit about the goal of replacing the moral standards taught by the Church with moral standards derived from reason alone. See, especially the end of "Part 2" and "Part 3.")
Progress: In the late seventeenth century, "the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns" in France and the related "battle of the books" in England raised an important Enlightenment question: Can a contemporary work be as good as or better than an ancient one? In the seventeenth century the answers to the question were divided, but eighteenth-century thinkers began to decide the question in the affirmative, in other words, in favor of the moderns. Enlightenment thinkers assumed that, though modernism owes much to the ancients because the Renaissance return to the ancients allowed moderns to begin to overcome the prejudices of religion and culture (prejudices most obvious in the teachings and practices of the Church), by the continuous use of reason, modernism continued to improve on the start made by Greek and Latin intellectuals.
As an offshoot of this discussion of the relative merits of the ancient and the modern, a belief in "natural salvation" came to be part of some eighteenth-century thought. According to that belief, the eventual result of the application of reason would be that every person would achieve immortality and complete wisdom in the flesh. Nineteenth-century thinkers used Darwin's work to explain and discuss this Enlightenment belief in human progress. However, prior to Darwin, Enlightenment thinkers assumed that progress was the consequence of the increasingly effective use of reason, with natural salvation as a goal to be held in principle, even if not possible in fact. (One result of this belief was an interest in universal education.)
For a good description of Enlightenment thinking about the Enlightenment, see Immanuel Kant's essay, Was ist Aufklärung? Kant says, "Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen" -- "Enlightenment is the passage of human beings out of their self-inflicted childhood. Childhood is the inability to exercise one's understanding without the direction of another" (35). Notice the Enlightenment prejudice against authority in this quotation: Kant takes it as indubitable that authority is a bad thing (and we should accept that it is on his authority). One kind of postmodern critique would show the ways in which Kant relies on authority or invokes his own authority in his rejection of authority.
Perhaps the first critics of the Enlightenment were the Romantics, Goethe, for example. Similarly, Wordsworth, Shelley, and Coleridge were clearly critical of the Enlightenment. Without stretching too far, one can understand Romanticism as an earlier incarnation of postmodernism. In this century, Michel Foucault responded to Kant with an essay by the same title, "What is Enlightenment?"
In a variety of ways, Enlightenment thinking continues to be an important part of twentieth-century common sense. Much of the discussion of modernism is, in fact, a discussion of the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason. However, from the beginning of modernism there have been reactions against it, reactions such as Methodism and Romanticism. We should understand postmodernism in the context of these reactions.
Feminism: The word feminism means many things to many people. Though Catherine MacKinnon's understanding of what feminism ought to mean does not represent all feminism, her definition of feminist theory is helpful as a general characterization: "A theory is feminist to the extent it is persuaded that women have been unjustly unequal to men because of the social meaning of their bodies" (35). Thus, feminism is any "system" of thought or political or social movement that incorporates the assumption that "women have been unjustly unequal to men because of the social meaning of their bodies." Such movements, theories, etc. can range across "a variety of views on the nature of women" (Richards) though they have in common that they argue "for a pluralistic vision of the world that regards as equally important the experiences of women of all races and classes" (Richards).
At its heart and in its many varieties, feminism recognizes that sexual difference is unlike any other difference since it cannot be thought in terms of the relations of classes, such as genera and species. Feminists ask questions about how we are to think sexual difference, about how we have ignored sexual difference in our practices and in our thinking, and about the consequences of how we have thought sexual difference as well as how we have ignored it. Feminists argue that sexual difference and its consequences are not just facts to be understood, but that understanding those facts and their implications is crucial to ethical thought and action.
Because Latter-day Saints sometimes find certain forms of feminism difficult to square with the Gospel, we often reject all feminism out of hand. However, as Mary Stovall Richards points out:
The doctrine of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints converges in some areas with the ideals of feminism and diverges in others. It insists on the absolute spiritual equality of women and men, proclaiming that "all are alike unto God," both "black and white, bond and free, male and female" (2 Ne. 26:33; Gal. 3:28). Gifts of the spirit are given equally to men and women: "And now, he imparteth his word by angels unto men, yea, not only men but women also" (Alma 32:23). LDS principles argue unequivocally for the development of the full potential of each person, regardless of gender. So central is the equality of all humankind to Christ's message that during his earthly ministry Christ openly rejected cultural proscriptions that relegated women to an inferior spiritual and political status. . . . Such equality of women and men is based on the celestial model of heavenly parents, both Father and Mother, who share "all power" and have "all things . . . subject unto them" (D&C 132:20) and who invite their children to emulate their example of perfect love and unity and become as they are. Mormons are taught that righteous power, held by heavenly parents and shared with their children, is never coercive but is characterized "by persuasion, by long-suffering, by gentleness and meekness, and by love unfeigned" (D&C 121:41). While the implications of these expansive beliefs are always subject to individual implementation, Mormon women and men have found in these doctrines sources of spiritual strength, including the desire to know more about Mother in Heaven. (Encyclopedia of Mormonism)
Metanarrative: A "grand theory," a narrative about narratives. A metanarrative is a story we tell about ourselves, what we do, and what is expected; it is a story that links our smaller stories together and gives us unity, social, psychological, and intellectual. Modernism includes several metanarratives, such as the story of progressive, global emancipation of people, minorities, etc.
Modernity: An intellectual movement that, in philosophy, is considered to have begun in approximately 1500 and continued into at least the early part of the nineteenth century. It includes the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment. Modernism was the first intellectual period to recognize periods of thoughts, defining itself in contradistinction to the thought that came before: ancient and medieval (i.e., "middle") thought. Depending on your philosophical ideology, Immanuel Kant or G. W. F. Hegel is usually thought of as the last, major modern philosopher. Philosophers speak of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy simply as "nineteenth-and twentieth-century philosophy," usually without trying to decide whether what happened since the early nineteenth century is a continuation of modernism. Most assume that, in some sense, it is, but the question is complicated by various things, among them the fact that nineteenth-century thinkers began to question modernism and many seemingly obvious modernist thinkers question important aspects of modernism. Romanticism was the first movement explicitly to do so, and, like postmodernism, it was both a philosophical and a literary and artistic movement. Since modernism begins by questioning the authority of the thinking that came before it, it is not clear whether thought that questions modernism truly breaks with modernism. Most postmodernist philosophers would argue that it does not. Two quotations describing modernity:
Stephen Daniel: The designation "modern" does not refer to a period in history as much as to a constellation of positions (e.g., a rational demand for unity, certainty, universality, and ultimacy) and beliefs (e.g., the belief that words, ideas, and things are distinct entities; the belief that the world represents a fixed object of analysis separate from forms of human discourse and cognitive representation; the belief that culture is subsequent to nature and that society is subsequent to the individual). (42)
Robert Pippin: It is pretty clear that this enterprise [modernity] includes such things as: the emergence of the "nation state," a political unit constituted by a common language and tradition, with an authority transcending local feudal fealty and based on some explicit common representative, even, eventually, on some self-understanding or "principle"; more and more ambitious claims for the supreme authority of "reason" in human affairs, contra the claims of tradition, the ancestors, and, especially, the Church (the public status of reason, it was hoped, could provide the social integration and cultural stability long a function of tradition and religion); the corresponding "demystification" of life, especially natural phenomena; an insistence on the natural rights of all individuals, above all else the right to freedom, the maximum expression of an individual's self-determination; the domination of social life by a free market economy, with its attendant phenomena of wage labor, urbanization, and the "private ownership of the means of production"; a belief in, if not the perfectibility, then at least the improvability of mankind, and a commitment (at least within the "official culture") to a variety of virtues that originate in Christian humanism: tolerance, sympathy, prudence, charity, and so on. In the aesthetic domain, modern forms of artistic expression eventually came to be understood as not bound to the imitation of classical models, to be distinct, and even, in the famous Quarrelle, to be superior to such models. Above all else, modernity is characterized by the view that human life after the political and intellectual revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is fundamentally better than before, and most likely will, thanks to such revolutions, be better still. (4)
Obviously, however the philosophers decide to categorize the philosophical movements from Romanticism to the present, modernism is very much with us today. Most of its assumptions and projects have become, for Euro-American cultures and those who have come under their influence, common sense.
Myth: A narrative that tells of origins--not necessarily "an untrue story." We often undertake to understand myths by understanding the patterns and structures by which they organize their material and give it meaning.
Negative Theology: A very old way of doing theology, with its start in at least Pseudo-Dionysus (c350-450, first mentioned 532; also known as St. Denys). The negative theologian recognizes that sentences such as "God is just" are inadequate to our understanding of God. As a consequence, one must also say "God is unjust," meaning that what God does is not like human justice, the only justice we understand. The point of negative theology is not to undo our understanding of God, but to remind us that, though we can say a great deal about God, we also have a very limited understanding of what that means. The point of negative theology is to remind us that God is sublime. Negative theology does not stand on its own; it can be understood only within the context of affirmative theology. The negative theologian would argue that the converse is also true: affirmative theology will not be true to its object unless it incorporates the insights of and limitations brought out by negative theology. At least some postmodern movements, such as deconstruction, can be understood as comparable to negative theology.
Perspectivism: The belief that knowledge is always a matter of "seeing-as," of seeing from a perspective. The contrary of perspectivism is the traditional Christian understanding of God's omniscience: the ability to see everything aperspectivally, an ability concomitant with his unembodied character. Though perspectivism is often confused with relativism, they are not the same and neither implies the other. The current interest in multi-culturalism is directly related to a growing acceptance of perspectivism.
Phenomenology: A contemporary movement in Euro-American philosophy that is most commonly associated with Continental rather than Anglo-American philosophy. As its name indicates, phenomenology is concerned with understanding phenomena. Phenomenology begins with Edmund Husserl as a response to late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German neo-Kantianism. Kant reversed the understanding of the naive realism that preceded him. Knowledge of objects, he argued, comes not from the objects themselves, but from the subject perceiving the objects. The subject organizes perceptions (though not consciously) and those organized perceptions are what the subject knows. Phenomenology goes a step further than Kant, arguing that the subject and the object are codeterminative, neither subject nor object is primary to knowledge. Thus, naive realism is right; the object does give itself to the subject. But it is also true that the subject determines the object. Therefore, the philosopher must understand the phenomenon as something codetermined in an event of understanding. Philosophy must understand what is codetermined if it is to understand the world.
To expand on that: Kant proposed that the phenomena are real as experience, but that we must also assume (though we cannot know whether our assumption is correct) that something stands "behind" the phenomena making them possible as phenomena. Kant called this realm behind the phenomena the noumenal realm. According to Kantianism, we cannot know the noumenal itself. We know the phenomenal, and we know the phenomenal in knowing the order that consciousness gives experience.
Phenomenology questions whether we must make the noumenal/phenomenal distinction, and it assumes that we see what is the world, directly. Husserl's motto was, "To the things themselves." In other words, concentrate on the actual things of experience, the phenomena, rather than either on mere appearances or what one assumes lies behind those appearances. According to phenomenology, we do not just see appearances or representations or orderings of the world, we see the world itself. When I look at the desk before me, I see the desk, not just a representation of it. Thus, phenomenology does not assume, as does Locke, that when we see something we see only a picture of it in our heads. Neither does phenomenology assume that we can only explain the phenomenal by referring to something unseen and beyond experience that stands behind the phenomena. Instead, phenomenology argues that the phenomena we experience are the things of the world, and it tries to understand and account for the world and the things in the world by careful attention to the phenomena themselves. Phenomenology's methods are often descriptive, especially in the beginning.
Martin Heidegger adopted the method and terminology of Husserl, his teacher, and gave them a twist of his own by pointing out that every phenomenon exists and is understood only within a horizon, against a Gestalt. When I say, "Look at the blackboard," we can understand the act of looking at the blackboard only in terms of the actual blackboard on which we focus our attention, and we can understand that actual blackboard only as part of a context or world. Heidegger argued that, as a result, (1) we must understand the horizon or context as well as the phenomena, (2) we must understand the horizon as horizon rather than as another phenomenon, and (3) we cannot understand phenomena in isolation. For Heidegger, among other things, this means that we cannot separate understanding and interpretation from the appearing of things. (One consequence is the development of "hermeneutic" philosophy by Heidegger's student, Hans-Georg Gadamer. See Truth and Method.)
The contemporary French philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas describes phenomenology in this way:
[It] consists in restoring that which is given, which bears a name, which is objective, to its background of intention, not only that intention which is directed towards the object, but to everything which calls it to concreteness, to the horizon. I've often said that it is research into the staging [mise en scéne] of that which is the object; the object which, left to itself, is clarified, as much as it closes off the gaze -- as if the given was like an eyelid which lowers itself as an object appears, and consequently as if the objective is always abstract. Concreteness is the ensemble of what is lived, of intentionality, which is not entirely heuristic; it includes the axiological and the affective. Consequently meaning is given in this concreteness. (In Mortley 14)
As mentioned in the beginning, within contemporary Western philosophy, we find two strains, the Anglo-American and Continental. Anglo-American (also called "analytic") philosophy and phenomenology (or "Continental philosophy") differ in several respects, both as to subject matter and approach. For example, Anglo-American philosophers prize a more or less scientific style, while Continental philosophers often write in a consciously literary style and, as mentioned, they often focus more on description than do analytic philosophers. Anglo-American philosophers usually see philosophy primarily in terms of sets of problems; Continental philosophers usually see philosophy primarily in terms of its history and texts. (Monique Schneider goes so far as to say, "I like to place myself at the crossroads between philosophy and a certain rhetorical style, which is quite natural--I don't recognize the separation of the two" [in Mortley 25].) Thus, an analytic philosopher will begin a discussion by situating it within the current discussion of a particular philosophical problem, and a Continental philosopher will often begin by situating his or her discussion within the history of philosophy, sometimes as a response to a particular philosopher, sometimes by taking up a particular text and responding to it. Of course, as with any generalizations, it is not difficult to find exceptions to these characterizations of Anglo-American and Continental philosophy. (For more on the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy, see Simon Critchley, Companion to Continental Philosophy.)
Though there was considerable hostility between the two approaches to philosophy during the fifties and sixties and into the seventies, the tension of that hostility has gradually reduced. Important Anglo-American philosophers, such as the Canadian, Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self), have been heavily influenced by Continental philosophy and, especially in Europe, Continental philosophers are often conversant with Anglo-American philosophy. (See, for example, Paul Ricoeur's book, Oneself as Another.)
Relativism: There are many sorts of relativism, on a continuum from the "strong," to the "weak." Strong relativism takes the extreme position that all truth is relative to particular contexts and that discussions of truth have meaning only in reference to the truth of their context. Weak relativism agrees that there is a contextual aspect to truth (most, but not all, weak relativists agree that truth is necessarily contextual). However, the weak relativist argues that truth also can and must be meaningfully discussed beyond context. Because the most extreme form of relativism involves the contradiction of holding that all truths except the truth of relativism are relative, few if any philosophers hold to a strong form of relativism. The common thread among the various kinds of relativism is that, as the name suggests, each holds truth to be relative to something (though that something can range from a state of affairs to a human to God) rather than unchanging and independent of any thing at all. Though relativism and perspectivism are often equated, neither implies the other; one could hold one of the two positions and not the other without contraction.
The Sublime: Like most other philosophical terms, the history of this word, a long history, is packed into its use. Thus, as with them, giving an explanation of the term without reviewing the history of its use is difficult and misleading. However, Edmund Burke's discussion of it may be helpful as a starting point. Burke distinguishes between two kinds of pleasure, that in response to the absence or diminution of pain and that relating to society, such as the pleasure of sexuality. According to Burke, the first of these is a response to the sublime and the second a response to the beautiful. He says:
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling. (39)
Not all philosophers have agreed with Burke about the origin of the distinction in the two kinds of pleasure that he describes, but most
accept the distinction between the sublime and the beautiful and the connection of the former to the terrible, in the root sense of that
word: inspiring awe or fear. For Kant, we can conceive that which is sublime, but we cannot apprehend it: "Nothing, therefore, which
can be an object of the senses is . . . to be called sublime" (Critique of Judgment 377). Rather than conforming to our understanding,
the sublime surpasses and overwhelms understanding. The sublime is excessive to understanding.
Works Cited
Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, J. T. Boulton, ed. Notre Dame, Indiana: U of Notre Dame, 1958.
Critchley, Simon and William R. Schroeder, eds . Companion to Continental Philosophy. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1998.
Daniel, Stephen. "Paramodern Strategies of Philosophical Historiography," Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 1, 1995.
Descartes, René. Discourse on Method for Rightly Conducting the Reason and Meditations on First Philosophy. L. J. Lafleur, trans. New York: Macmillan (Library of Liberal Arts), 1960.
Edwards, Paul, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan, 1967.
Foucault, Michel. "What is Enlightenment?" The Foucault Reader. Paul Rabinow, ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 1984. 32-50.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr, 1972. (Translated as: Truth and Method, 2nd rvsd. New York:
Continuum, 1993, (c) 1989).
Kant, Immanuel. "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?" Kants gesammelte Schriften, vol. 8. Bonn: Royal Prussian
Academy, 1988. 35-42. (Translated in: Lewis White Beck, ed. Kant Selections. New York: Macmillan, 1988. 462-467.)
__________. The Critique of the Faculty of Judgment. Excerpted in: Lewis White Beck, ed. Kant Selections. New York: Macmillan, 1988. 341-409.
McKinnon, Catherine. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1989.
Mortley, Raoul. French Philosophers in Conversation. London: Routledge, 1991.
Pippin, Robert. Modernism as a Philosophical Problem. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
Richards, Mary Stovall. "Feminism," The Encyclopedia of Mormonism, vol. 2. Daniel H. Ludlow, ed. New York: Macmillan Reference, 1992.
Ricoeur, Paul. Oneself as Another. Kathleen Blamey, trans. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1992.
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1989.