Jennifer McBride

EN 721-Dr. Williamson

 

UnStable Ideas: Temperament, Cognition, and Self

By Jerome Kagan

 

Once again I have read a text that brings about more questions than answers, but such is the world of academia.  By reading this book, Kagan, “hope[s] readers will gain a richer understanding of the unstable relation between the meanings of propositions in the literature on human behavior and the invisible events each imagines to be their true source”  (31).  This book is based on the premise that facts are not as stable, dependable, and as useful as we once thought them to be.  There are numerous issues in which fact alone cannot assist us.  It is then that we must call upon the consciousness for assistance.  Kagan argues that, “data, presuppositions, and logic mix in a mysterious way to influence the values of a person or a community”  (31).  I particularly liked his inclusion of a statement by Morton White: “‘Sentiment is not enough, logic is not enough, and experience is not enough, if we wish to know and to know what to do.  Each should be given its due by the intelligent man as he tests his stock of beliefs and actions’  (1972, p.310)”  (31).  My question then…Are we really talking about conscience rather than consciousness? 

The book itself is a compilation of Kagan’s essays divided into four parts and then consequently subdivided into nine chapters.  I focus on some chapters more than others for reasons of interest as well as my level of understanding.  I include numerous direct quotes to more clearly convey his ideas as well as page numbers to point readers to specific areas of interest.   

 

Part One: On Meaning

Chapter One—Meaning and Procedure:  Words have both a sense meaning and a referent meaning.  Word sense “is the thought is expresses” (Frege) and “the referential meaning is contained in the events to which the word points”  (36).  Since this is not always the same given different circumstances, the meaning of the word changes.  Because of this Kagan declares the importance of considering broader implications for the meanings of words when doing any type of experimenting or testing.

Chapter Two—Twentieth-Century Trends in Developmental Psychology:  According to Kagan, in the late nineteenth century Darwinism and an increasing concern with a child’s character/talent were the driving forces behind “developmental inquiry”  (69).  As a result Behaviorism became more popular.  Later the study of cognitive development replaced interests in the social science field.  Currently, social scientists are concentrating on four major issues: “(1) perception and attachment processes in the infant and the older child, (2) cognitive functions, (3) peer-group relations, [and] (4) morality”  (95).

 

Part Two: Temperament 

Chapter Three—The Idea of Temperamental Types:  Kagan calls for a multi-faceted view of the idea of temperament where we take into consideration not only the biological factors but also all “of the experiences to which the changing temperamental surfaces have accommodated”  (12).  He compares the understanding of temperament from the 17th and 18th centuries to the current idea mentioned above.  He says that society needs to “invent a new set of constructs for temperamental categories in which biological, psychological, and contextual features are combined”  (142).

Chapter Four—Inhibited and Uninhibited Children:  Kagan supplies the following reasons for studying whether or not a child has inhibitions: that social class has no bearing on this temperament, situations where this temperament is displayed occur frequently, and “almost every commentator on human nature, from Hippocrates to modern personologists, has noted these two contrasting characteristics.”  Furthermore, this temperament appears to be “among the most stable and heritable in contemporary psychology (Conley, 1985; Floderus-Myrhed, Pedersen, and Rasmusen 1980; Loehlin, 1982; Plomin, 1986)”  (143).  Therefore, the implication is that the question of the possession of inhibitions is easier to study than other less stable ones.     

 

Part Three: Cognition

Chapter Five—On Cognitive Development:  Kagan insists that social scientists need become more specific and better contextualize the terms that they use in relation to studying cognitive processes.  He gives the example that “Terms like memory and perception should be replaced with phrases like recognition memory for the shapes of objects or the perception of motion”  (14).     

Chapter Six—Creativity in Science:  In this short chapter, Kagan defines several meanings of creativity but specifies that “products that generate a specific cognitive and emotional response in an audience…” is the definition that he will be working from in this case  (206).  This does not seem to follow his line of thinking that words are “unstable” however clarifying the specific definition that he is working from is understandable in this case as he lays out the following stipulations that must occur to constitute “a creative product”: “special talent in a domain, the motivation to be creative, which is influenced by childhood experiences, and finally, chance events that permit the talent and the desire to be actualized”  (207).  If I understand Kagan correctly, the connection here is that creativity is not a stable idea (like the others mentioned in the title) either and many pieces must fall into place before one is recognized as creative. 

 

Part Four: Self

Chapter Seven—The Emergence of Self-Awareness:  Kagan presents research from a project where he studied the idea of self-awareness in a total of 30 children.  Around the age of 2, the children began to show signs such as, “the ability to appreciate the psychological state of another” and “the occurrence of a smile after the child has attained a goal through effort”—Kagan specifies that this smile is “private” rather than “social”  (230).  He attempts to redefine self-awareness as “‘the capacity to hold cognitive representations on the stage of active memory’”  (237).

Chapter Eight—Measuring the Concept of Self:  Kagan describes three different research efforts to understand the concept of Self.  He laments of the plausibility of studies of self-concept claiming that at best, “each datum adds a little knowledge to the family of processes implied by this term”  (260).  He wants scientists to take a more qualitative approach to the research rather than focusing solely on quantitative results. 

Chapter Nine—Self-Consciousness: A Dialogue Without Answers:  Presents Kagan’s questions pertaining to self and consciousness in a conversation between an older female tutor and her student, who is a philosopher.  The Dialogue is long and convoluted much like Plato’s The Phaedrus.

 

Two Quotes that seem to summarize his ideas:

 

“Facts prune the tree of morality; they cannot be the seedbed”  (29).

“Consciousness can be likened to the staff of a fire department.  Most of the time, it is quietly playing pinochle in the back room; it performs when the alarm sounds”  (18-19).